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    <title>Adam's Podcast</title>
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    <description>This is for Adam Davidson's personal use. </description>
    <copyright>(c) Adam Davidson</copyright>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:37:05 -0500</pubDate>
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    <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
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    <itunes:summary>This is for Adam Davidson's personal use. </itunes:summary>
    <itunes:subtitle>This is for Adam Davidson's personal use.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:name>Adam Davidson</itunes:name>
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    <itunes:complete>No</itunes:complete>
    <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
    <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
    <podcast:block>yes</podcast:block>
    <item>
      <title>Module 1: What do people mean by "thinking"?</title>
      <itunes:episode>1</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>1</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 1: What do people mean by "thinking"?</itunes:title>
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      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
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        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 1a and 1b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 1a: Four answers to one question. Starting from Hannah Arendt at the Eichmann trial, where she found "not stupidity but thoughtlessness," this lesson sets four answers to "what is thinking?" side by side: philosophy's (Descartes, Dewey, Arendt, Wittgenstein), psychology's (William James's stream of thought and a handbook's working definition), neuroscience's awkward non-answer (György Buzsáki's argument that "thinking" may not be a brain category at all), and a Pali Buddhist discourse in which thoughts can be watched and let go. Then it shows where they collide.</p><p>23:03 Lesson 1b: The cases that break the definitions. A horse in 1904 Berlin that seemed to do arithmetic, a chimpanzee who solved a problem while playing, a crow bending wire into hooks, and a famous infant study that failed to replicate. The lesson then turns to machines, from Descartes's two tests to Turing's imitation game, Searle's Chinese room and Bender and Koller's octopus, and argues that "what exactly is it doing, and when does it stop working?" is a better question than "does it think?"</p>]]>
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        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 1a and 1b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 1a: Four answers to one question. Starting from Hannah Arendt at the Eichmann trial, where she found "not stupidity but thoughtlessness," this lesson sets four answers to "what is thinking?" side by side: philosophy's (Descartes, Dewey, Arendt, Wittgenstein), psychology's (William James's stream of thought and a handbook's working definition), neuroscience's awkward non-answer (György Buzsáki's argument that "thinking" may not be a brain category at all), and a Pali Buddhist discourse in which thoughts can be watched and let go. Then it shows where they collide.</p><p>23:03 Lesson 1b: The cases that break the definitions. A horse in 1904 Berlin that seemed to do arithmetic, a chimpanzee who solved a problem while playing, a crow bending wire into hooks, and a famous infant study that failed to replicate. The lesson then turns to machines, from Descartes's two tests to Turing's imitation game, Searle's Chinese room and Bender and Koller's octopus, and argues that "what exactly is it doing, and when does it stop working?" is a better question than "does it think?"</p>]]>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:01:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
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      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>2782</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 1a and 1b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 1a: Four answers to one question. Starting from Hannah Arendt at the Eichmann trial, where she found "not stupidity but thoughtlessness," this lesson sets four answers to "what is thinking?" side by side: philosophy's (Descartes, Dewey, Arendt, Wittgenstein), psychology's (William James's stream of thought and a handbook's working definition), neuroscience's awkward non-answer (György Buzsáki's argument that "thinking" may not be a brain category at all), and a Pali Buddhist discourse in which thoughts can be watched and let go. Then it shows where they collide.</p><p>23:03 Lesson 1b: The cases that break the definitions. A horse in 1904 Berlin that seemed to do arithmetic, a chimpanzee who solved a problem while playing, a crow bending wire into hooks, and a famous infant study that failed to replicate. The lesson then turns to machines, from Descartes's two tests to Turing's imitation game, Searle's Chinese room and Bender and Koller's octopus, and argues that "what exactly is it doing, and when does it stop working?" is a better question than "does it think?"</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
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    <item>
      <title>Module 2: Thinking in the brain</title>
      <itunes:episode>2</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>2</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 2: Thinking in the brain</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
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        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 2a, 2b and 2c, about 70 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 2a: The brain at rest, and how to read a brain scan. How Marcus Raichle's folder on a "mystery medial parietal area" became the default mode network, what the wandering mind is doing (one large app-based study found minds wandering in nearly half of sampled moments), and Kalina Christoff's account of mind-wandering as free movement rather than off-task content. Then three cautions for any brain-scan headline: the dead salmon, reverse inference, and small samples.</p><p>22:18 Lesson 2b: The flash of insight and the gut feeling. Is the "aha" moment a different kind of thinking, or just a different feeling? A 2004 brain study of insight puzzles, the argument that the feeling of insight is a useful but hijackable signal, Antonio Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis and the Iowa card game behind it, the strong challenge from Maia and McClelland, and Lisa Feldman Barrett's theory that emotions are built on the spot.</p><p>45:51 Lesson 2c: The big theories, and the fight over them. The main theories of how the brain produces conscious experience, and what happened when two rival camps, global workspace theory and integrated information theory, agreed in advance to a head-to-head test. The 2025 results, each side's response, the open letter calling integrated information theory pseudoscience, Anil Seth's "controlled hallucination," and the gap that remains: none of these is yet a theory of thinking.</p>]]>
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      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 2a, 2b and 2c, about 70 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 2a: The brain at rest, and how to read a brain scan. How Marcus Raichle's folder on a "mystery medial parietal area" became the default mode network, what the wandering mind is doing (one large app-based study found minds wandering in nearly half of sampled moments), and Kalina Christoff's account of mind-wandering as free movement rather than off-task content. Then three cautions for any brain-scan headline: the dead salmon, reverse inference, and small samples.</p><p>22:18 Lesson 2b: The flash of insight and the gut feeling. Is the "aha" moment a different kind of thinking, or just a different feeling? A 2004 brain study of insight puzzles, the argument that the feeling of insight is a useful but hijackable signal, Antonio Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis and the Iowa card game behind it, the strong challenge from Maia and McClelland, and Lisa Feldman Barrett's theory that emotions are built on the spot.</p><p>45:51 Lesson 2c: The big theories, and the fight over them. The main theories of how the brain produces conscious experience, and what happened when two rival camps, global workspace theory and integrated information theory, agreed in advance to a head-to-head test. The 2025 results, each side's response, the open letter calling integrated information theory pseudoscience, Anil Seth's "controlled hallucination," and the gap that remains: none of these is yet a theory of thinking.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:02:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
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      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>4178</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 2a, 2b and 2c, about 70 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 2a: The brain at rest, and how to read a brain scan. How Marcus Raichle's folder on a "mystery medial parietal area" became the default mode network, what the wandering mind is doing (one large app-based study found minds wandering in nearly half of sampled moments), and Kalina Christoff's account of mind-wandering as free movement rather than off-task content. Then three cautions for any brain-scan headline: the dead salmon, reverse inference, and small samples.</p><p>22:18 Lesson 2b: The flash of insight and the gut feeling. Is the "aha" moment a different kind of thinking, or just a different feeling? A 2004 brain study of insight puzzles, the argument that the feeling of insight is a useful but hijackable signal, Antonio Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis and the Iowa card game behind it, the strong challenge from Maia and McClelland, and Lisa Feldman Barrett's theory that emotions are built on the spot.</p><p>45:51 Lesson 2c: The big theories, and the fight over them. The main theories of how the brain produces conscious experience, and what happened when two rival camps, global workspace theory and integrated information theory, agreed in advance to a head-to-head test. The 2025 results, each side's response, the open letter calling integrated information theory pseudoscience, Anil Seth's "controlled hallucination," and the gap that remains: none of these is yet a theory of thinking.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
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    <item>
      <title>Module 3: Thinking from the inside, part 1</title>
      <itunes:episode>3</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>3</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 3: Thinking from the inside, part 1</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
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        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 3a and 3b, about 45 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 3a: The voice you think you hear. What is actually in your mind when you think, and can you trust your own answer? Russell Hurlburt's beeper studies, which find inner speech in about a quarter of sampled moments and wordless "unsymbolized thinking" about as often; the dispute over whether some people have no inner voice at all; and the case against trusting introspection, from Eric Schwitzgebel and from Nisbett and Wilson's "Telling More Than We Can Know."</p><p>22:35 Lesson 3b: What words do to a thought. What happens to a thought when it is put into words? Evidence that much thinking survives severe loss of language, what inner speech is for, William James's "intention of saying a thing," verbal overshadowing (describing a face can impair memory of it, a smaller effect than first reported in a replication across dozens of labs), naming feelings, and Eugene Gendlin's argument that fresh words carry a felt sense forward rather than trapping it.</p>]]>
      </description>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 3a and 3b, about 45 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 3a: The voice you think you hear. What is actually in your mind when you think, and can you trust your own answer? Russell Hurlburt's beeper studies, which find inner speech in about a quarter of sampled moments and wordless "unsymbolized thinking" about as often; the dispute over whether some people have no inner voice at all; and the case against trusting introspection, from Eric Schwitzgebel and from Nisbett and Wilson's "Telling More Than We Can Know."</p><p>22:35 Lesson 3b: What words do to a thought. What happens to a thought when it is put into words? Evidence that much thinking survives severe loss of language, what inner speech is for, William James's "intention of saying a thing," verbal overshadowing (describing a face can impair memory of it, a smaller effect than first reported in a replication across dozens of labs), naming feelings, and Eugene Gendlin's argument that fresh words carry a felt sense forward rather than trapping it.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:03:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
      <enclosure url="https://media.transistor.fm/56b6e560/50879a5e.mp3" length="32802129" type="audio/mpeg"/>
      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>2727</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 3a and 3b, about 45 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 3a: The voice you think you hear. What is actually in your mind when you think, and can you trust your own answer? Russell Hurlburt's beeper studies, which find inner speech in about a quarter of sampled moments and wordless "unsymbolized thinking" about as often; the dispute over whether some people have no inner voice at all; and the case against trusting introspection, from Eric Schwitzgebel and from Nisbett and Wilson's "Telling More Than We Can Know."</p><p>22:35 Lesson 3b: What words do to a thought. What happens to a thought when it is put into words? Evidence that much thinking survives severe loss of language, what inner speech is for, William James's "intention of saying a thing," verbal overshadowing (describing a face can impair memory of it, a smaller effect than first reported in a replication across dozens of labs), naming feelings, and Eugene Gendlin's argument that fresh words carry a felt sense forward rather than trapping it.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
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    <item>
      <title>Module 3: Thinking from the inside, part 2</title>
      <itunes:episode>4</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>4</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 3: Thinking from the inside, part 2</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
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        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 3c and 3d, about 48 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 3c: The truth that can't be said. The idea, in Buddhism and in Western philosophy, that the real truth cannot be put into words, tested against the texts themselves: discourses of the Buddha from the Pali canon, Vimalakirti's famous silence, the Zen koans of The Gateless Gate, Wittgenstein's ladder, and William James on mystical states. The lesson makes the strongest case these texts allow for the unsayable, and shows where they complicate it.</p><p>23:54 Lesson 3d: Living with the unsayable. What do traditions that hold the truth is unsayable actually do about it? Mipham's warning that a blank mind is indescribable too, Indian Buddhist philosophers' disagreement over what the "ultimate" even is, Tibetan meditation manuals that call blocking thought a mistake, the three steps of understanding, experience and realization, Robert Sharf's skeptical critique, and William James's answer: treat such reports as hypotheses.</p>]]>
      </description>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 3c and 3d, about 48 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 3c: The truth that can't be said. The idea, in Buddhism and in Western philosophy, that the real truth cannot be put into words, tested against the texts themselves: discourses of the Buddha from the Pali canon, Vimalakirti's famous silence, the Zen koans of The Gateless Gate, Wittgenstein's ladder, and William James on mystical states. The lesson makes the strongest case these texts allow for the unsayable, and shows where they complicate it.</p><p>23:54 Lesson 3d: Living with the unsayable. What do traditions that hold the truth is unsayable actually do about it? Mipham's warning that a blank mind is indescribable too, Indian Buddhist philosophers' disagreement over what the "ultimate" even is, Tibetan meditation manuals that call blocking thought a mistake, the three steps of understanding, experience and realization, Robert Sharf's skeptical critique, and William James's answer: treat such reports as hypotheses.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:04:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
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      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>2856</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 3c and 3d, about 48 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 3c: The truth that can't be said. The idea, in Buddhism and in Western philosophy, that the real truth cannot be put into words, tested against the texts themselves: discourses of the Buddha from the Pali canon, Vimalakirti's famous silence, the Zen koans of The Gateless Gate, Wittgenstein's ladder, and William James on mystical states. The lesson makes the strongest case these texts allow for the unsayable, and shows where they complicate it.</p><p>23:54 Lesson 3d: Living with the unsayable. What do traditions that hold the truth is unsayable actually do about it? Mipham's warning that a blank mind is indescribable too, Indian Buddhist philosophers' disagreement over what the "ultimate" even is, Tibetan meditation manuals that call blocking thought a mistake, the three steps of understanding, experience and realization, Robert Sharf's skeptical critique, and William James's answer: treat such reports as hypotheses.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
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    <item>
      <title>Module 4: Thinking outside the skull</title>
      <itunes:episode>5</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>5</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 4: Thinking outside the skull</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
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        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 4a and 4b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 4a: The mind in the notebook. Can a notebook be part of your mind? Clark and Chalmers's "extended mind" argument, with Otto and his notebook, and the critics' replies. Then writing as a way of thinking: Paul Graham's essays, Vygotsky's "thought is completed in the word," and what research on writing shows, which is that writing helps learning when it makes you rework what you know, and that the feeling of understanding it gives can mislead.</p><p>22:23 Lesson 4b: Thinking toward other people. Is thinking a social act, even when we are alone? Kleist finding his ideas while talking to his sister, Vygotsky on children's self-talk, experiments on accountability and brainstorming (expecting unseen judges cut the number of ideas), Mercier and Sperber's theory that reasoning evolved for arguing and the replies to it, and a beeper study suggesting people alone mostly think about themselves.</p>]]>
      </description>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 4a and 4b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 4a: The mind in the notebook. Can a notebook be part of your mind? Clark and Chalmers's "extended mind" argument, with Otto and his notebook, and the critics' replies. Then writing as a way of thinking: Paul Graham's essays, Vygotsky's "thought is completed in the word," and what research on writing shows, which is that writing helps learning when it makes you rework what you know, and that the feeling of understanding it gives can mislead.</p><p>22:23 Lesson 4b: Thinking toward other people. Is thinking a social act, even when we are alone? Kleist finding his ideas while talking to his sister, Vygotsky on children's self-talk, experiments on accountability and brainstorming (expecting unseen judges cut the number of ideas), Mercier and Sperber's theory that reasoning evolved for arguing and the replies to it, and a beeper study suggesting people alone mostly think about themselves.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:05:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
      <enclosure url="https://media.transistor.fm/b9604344/1ef0458c.mp3" length="32941304" type="audio/mpeg"/>
      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>2738</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 4a and 4b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 4a: The mind in the notebook. Can a notebook be part of your mind? Clark and Chalmers's "extended mind" argument, with Otto and his notebook, and the critics' replies. Then writing as a way of thinking: Paul Graham's essays, Vygotsky's "thought is completed in the word," and what research on writing shows, which is that writing helps learning when it makes you rework what you know, and that the feeling of understanding it gives can mislead.</p><p>22:23 Lesson 4b: Thinking toward other people. Is thinking a social act, even when we are alone? Kleist finding his ideas while talking to his sister, Vygotsky on children's self-talk, experiments on accountability and brainstorming (expecting unseen judges cut the number of ideas), Mercier and Sperber's theory that reasoning evolved for arguing and the replies to it, and a beeper study suggesting people alone mostly think about themselves.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
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    <item>
      <title>Module 5: What counts as "better"?</title>
      <itunes:episode>6</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>6</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 5: What counts as "better"?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
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        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 5a and 5b, about 48 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 5a: Clever, rational, critical. "Better thinking" has more than one yardstick. This lesson takes the first three: intelligence (what IQ tests predict, and what their own experts say they leave out), rationality (Keith Stanovich's "dysrationalia," the bat-and-ball puzzle, and Stuart Ritchie's reply that rationality scores track IQ closely), and critical thinking (a 1990 expert panel's definition, and Daniel Willingham's argument that it depends on knowing the subject).</p><p>23:24 Lesson 5b: Scored by the world. Three yardsticks scored by something other than an answer key: forecasting, where the world keeps score (Philip Tetlock's experts, hedgehogs and foxes, and a large forecasting tournament); wisdom (a 2020 review of what wisdom researchers agree on); and creativity (the case against the idea that intelligence helps only up to a threshold). It ends with three questions for any claim that one piece of thinking is better than another.</p>]]>
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      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 5a and 5b, about 48 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 5a: Clever, rational, critical. "Better thinking" has more than one yardstick. This lesson takes the first three: intelligence (what IQ tests predict, and what their own experts say they leave out), rationality (Keith Stanovich's "dysrationalia," the bat-and-ball puzzle, and Stuart Ritchie's reply that rationality scores track IQ closely), and critical thinking (a 1990 expert panel's definition, and Daniel Willingham's argument that it depends on knowing the subject).</p><p>23:24 Lesson 5b: Scored by the world. Three yardsticks scored by something other than an answer key: forecasting, where the world keeps score (Philip Tetlock's experts, hedgehogs and foxes, and a large forecasting tournament); wisdom (a 2020 review of what wisdom researchers agree on); and creativity (the case against the idea that intelligence helps only up to a threshold). It ends with three questions for any claim that one piece of thinking is better than another.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:06:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
      <enclosure url="https://media.transistor.fm/ce9887e5/9165f0e9.mp3" length="34723062" type="audio/mpeg"/>
      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>2887</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 5a and 5b, about 48 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 5a: Clever, rational, critical. "Better thinking" has more than one yardstick. This lesson takes the first three: intelligence (what IQ tests predict, and what their own experts say they leave out), rationality (Keith Stanovich's "dysrationalia," the bat-and-ball puzzle, and Stuart Ritchie's reply that rationality scores track IQ closely), and critical thinking (a 1990 expert panel's definition, and Daniel Willingham's argument that it depends on knowing the subject).</p><p>23:24 Lesson 5b: Scored by the world. Three yardsticks scored by something other than an answer key: forecasting, where the world keeps score (Philip Tetlock's experts, hedgehogs and foxes, and a large forecasting tournament); wisdom (a 2020 review of what wisdom researchers agree on); and creativity (the case against the idea that intelligence helps only up to a threshold). It ends with three questions for any claim that one piece of thinking is better than another.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Module 6: Divergent and convergent</title>
      <itunes:episode>7</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>7</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 6: Divergent and convergent</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">210612fa-95e9-44d5-9538-bec230f3ea89</guid>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 6a, 6b and 6c, about 66 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 6a: Making ideas and picking one. The two halves of creative work: making ideas and choosing among them. J. P. Guilford's 1950 address, the Torrance Tests of creative thinking and the debate over whether they measure creativity, and experiments finding that people are poor at picking their own best ideas, including Justin Berg's finding that the idea people ranked second often turned out best.</p><p>22:58 Lesson 6b: What newcomers see, and what experts see. What do newcomers and outsiders see that experts don't, and who judges their ideas? How familiar solutions block better ones (the Einstellung effect, even in strong chess players), outsiders solving problems on the InnoCentive contest site (most of whom held PhDs), how expert grant reviewers scored novel proposals, a study of who best predicts which novel circus acts succeed, and Benjamin Jones on the growing "burden of knowledge."</p><p>44:11 Lesson 6c: Fresh eyes, and how long they last. The newcomer's own kind of insight, and how long it lasts. Erik Dane's theory of cognitive entrenchment, Pamela Hinds's "curse of expertise" experiments (people only a little way along predicted beginners' difficulty best), Matt Beane's fieldwork on fresh eyes and juniors teaching seniors, and a study of junior consultants new to GPT-4 who misread its risks.</p>]]>
      </description>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 6a, 6b and 6c, about 66 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 6a: Making ideas and picking one. The two halves of creative work: making ideas and choosing among them. J. P. Guilford's 1950 address, the Torrance Tests of creative thinking and the debate over whether they measure creativity, and experiments finding that people are poor at picking their own best ideas, including Justin Berg's finding that the idea people ranked second often turned out best.</p><p>22:58 Lesson 6b: What newcomers see, and what experts see. What do newcomers and outsiders see that experts don't, and who judges their ideas? How familiar solutions block better ones (the Einstellung effect, even in strong chess players), outsiders solving problems on the InnoCentive contest site (most of whom held PhDs), how expert grant reviewers scored novel proposals, a study of who best predicts which novel circus acts succeed, and Benjamin Jones on the growing "burden of knowledge."</p><p>44:11 Lesson 6c: Fresh eyes, and how long they last. The newcomer's own kind of insight, and how long it lasts. Erik Dane's theory of cognitive entrenchment, Pamela Hinds's "curse of expertise" experiments (people only a little way along predicted beginners' difficulty best), Matt Beane's fieldwork on fresh eyes and juniors teaching seniors, and a study of junior consultants new to GPT-4 who misread its risks.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:07:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
      <enclosure url="https://media.transistor.fm/4c8a136e/939f7015.mp3" length="47707591" type="audio/mpeg"/>
      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>3969</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 6a, 6b and 6c, about 66 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 6a: Making ideas and picking one. The two halves of creative work: making ideas and choosing among them. J. P. Guilford's 1950 address, the Torrance Tests of creative thinking and the debate over whether they measure creativity, and experiments finding that people are poor at picking their own best ideas, including Justin Berg's finding that the idea people ranked second often turned out best.</p><p>22:58 Lesson 6b: What newcomers see, and what experts see. What do newcomers and outsiders see that experts don't, and who judges their ideas? How familiar solutions block better ones (the Einstellung effect, even in strong chess players), outsiders solving problems on the InnoCentive contest site (most of whom held PhDs), how expert grant reviewers scored novel proposals, a study of who best predicts which novel circus acts succeed, and Benjamin Jones on the growing "burden of knowledge."</p><p>44:11 Lesson 6c: Fresh eyes, and how long they last. The newcomer's own kind of insight, and how long it lasts. Erik Dane's theory of cognitive entrenchment, Pamela Hinds's "curse of expertise" experiments (people only a little way along predicted beginners' difficulty best), Matt Beane's fieldwork on fresh eyes and juniors teaching seniors, and a study of junior consultants new to GPT-4 who misread its risks.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Module 7: Intuition, bias and the gut</title>
      <itunes:episode>8</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>8</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 7: Intuition, bias and the gut</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">78bb69aa-22d8-429a-ae36-7b43d144f88e</guid>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 7a, 7b and 7c, about 66 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 7a: The case against the gut, and the quarrel it started. The strongest case against fast judgment, and the fight it started. Daniel Kahneman's officer assessments in the Israeli army and the "illusion of validity," Paul Meehl's clinicians and the simple formulas that matched or beat them, Tversky and Kahneman's three mental shortcuts (representativeness, availability, anchoring), Gerd Gigerenzer's argument that many "biases" shrink when problems are put as frequencies, Kahneman and Tversky's 1996 reply, an "adversarial collaboration" that settled nothing but showed a better way to argue, and two famous findings, behavioral priming and ego depletion, that shrank in larger replications.</p><p>24:20 Lesson 7b: When can you trust your gut? Newborn-ward nurses who sensed infection before the blood tests showed it, Gary Klein's fire commanders acting on recognition (and Klein's own warning that his interviews never showed whether their decisions were good), and the 2009 paper in which Kahneman and Klein expected to disagree and mostly didn't: skilled intuition is recognition, it needs a world with real regularities and a chance to learn them with feedback, and the feeling of confidence can't tell good intuitions from bad. Then what newcomers and experts each see, and where the two men still split: checklists, and whether guarding against error gets in the way of insight.</p><p>45:47 Lesson 7c: Simple rules, and signals from the body. Expert handball players whose first choice beat their considered one, while novice golfers did better with more time. Gigerenzer's case that simple rules can beat complex models where prediction is hard, the Michigan doctors who learned which cues mattered, and the limits Gigerenzer sets himself. Then the Iowa card game and the somatic marker hypothesis: the 1997 claim that the body knows first, Maia and McClelland's 2004 challenge, and the Iowa group's reply that the hypothesis is about emotion helping thought, conscious or not. It ends by asking what the whole module says about barely formed instincts.</p>]]>
      </description>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 7a, 7b and 7c, about 66 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 7a: The case against the gut, and the quarrel it started. The strongest case against fast judgment, and the fight it started. Daniel Kahneman's officer assessments in the Israeli army and the "illusion of validity," Paul Meehl's clinicians and the simple formulas that matched or beat them, Tversky and Kahneman's three mental shortcuts (representativeness, availability, anchoring), Gerd Gigerenzer's argument that many "biases" shrink when problems are put as frequencies, Kahneman and Tversky's 1996 reply, an "adversarial collaboration" that settled nothing but showed a better way to argue, and two famous findings, behavioral priming and ego depletion, that shrank in larger replications.</p><p>24:20 Lesson 7b: When can you trust your gut? Newborn-ward nurses who sensed infection before the blood tests showed it, Gary Klein's fire commanders acting on recognition (and Klein's own warning that his interviews never showed whether their decisions were good), and the 2009 paper in which Kahneman and Klein expected to disagree and mostly didn't: skilled intuition is recognition, it needs a world with real regularities and a chance to learn them with feedback, and the feeling of confidence can't tell good intuitions from bad. Then what newcomers and experts each see, and where the two men still split: checklists, and whether guarding against error gets in the way of insight.</p><p>45:47 Lesson 7c: Simple rules, and signals from the body. Expert handball players whose first choice beat their considered one, while novice golfers did better with more time. Gigerenzer's case that simple rules can beat complex models where prediction is hard, the Michigan doctors who learned which cues mattered, and the limits Gigerenzer sets himself. Then the Iowa card game and the somatic marker hypothesis: the 1997 claim that the body knows first, Maia and McClelland's 2004 challenge, and the Iowa group's reply that the hypothesis is about emotion helping thought, conscious or not. It ends by asking what the whole module says about barely formed instincts.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:08:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
      <enclosure url="https://media.transistor.fm/fe01ce93/cfeb41a6.mp3" length="47939946" type="audio/mpeg"/>
      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>3988</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 7a, 7b and 7c, about 66 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 7a: The case against the gut, and the quarrel it started. The strongest case against fast judgment, and the fight it started. Daniel Kahneman's officer assessments in the Israeli army and the "illusion of validity," Paul Meehl's clinicians and the simple formulas that matched or beat them, Tversky and Kahneman's three mental shortcuts (representativeness, availability, anchoring), Gerd Gigerenzer's argument that many "biases" shrink when problems are put as frequencies, Kahneman and Tversky's 1996 reply, an "adversarial collaboration" that settled nothing but showed a better way to argue, and two famous findings, behavioral priming and ego depletion, that shrank in larger replications.</p><p>24:20 Lesson 7b: When can you trust your gut? Newborn-ward nurses who sensed infection before the blood tests showed it, Gary Klein's fire commanders acting on recognition (and Klein's own warning that his interviews never showed whether their decisions were good), and the 2009 paper in which Kahneman and Klein expected to disagree and mostly didn't: skilled intuition is recognition, it needs a world with real regularities and a chance to learn them with feedback, and the feeling of confidence can't tell good intuitions from bad. Then what newcomers and experts each see, and where the two men still split: checklists, and whether guarding against error gets in the way of insight.</p><p>45:47 Lesson 7c: Simple rules, and signals from the body. Expert handball players whose first choice beat their considered one, while novice golfers did better with more time. Gigerenzer's case that simple rules can beat complex models where prediction is hard, the Michigan doctors who learned which cues mattered, and the limits Gigerenzer sets himself. Then the Iowa card game and the somatic marker hypothesis: the 1997 claim that the body knows first, Maia and McClelland's 2004 challenge, and the Iowa group's reply that the hypothesis is about emotion helping thought, conscious or not. It ends by asking what the whole module says about barely formed instincts.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Module 8: Can thinking be improved?</title>
      <itunes:episode>9</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>9</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 8: Can thinking be improved?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">09bafcc9-bc01-4693-8e7b-6bc9eb0ce92f</guid>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 8a and 8b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 8a: Why skills stay where they were learned. The "transfer problem": skills learned in one setting so often fail to carry over to another. William James timing his own memorizing, Thorndike and Woodworth's 1901 experiments (training on rectangles barely helped with triangles), the tumor-and-fortress puzzle, in which most people missed an analogy they had just read until a second example helped, Daniel Willingham's argument that critical thinking is tied to knowing a field, and what large reviews found about brain-training games: big gains on the games themselves, little elsewhere, and benefits that shrink as studies get better.</p><p>23:02 Lesson 8b: What training can do, and how far it reaches. Training that does seem to work, and how far it travels: a meta-analysis of critical thinking courses (modest gains on tests, with about one result in four going the other way), a debiasing video game that, in one field study at a Paris business school, cut the share of students choosing a Challenger-style bad bet from about 72 to 59 percent, under an hour of probability training that helped forecasters across a four-year tournament, and creativity training that raises creativity-test scores, with wide variation. What the successes share: focus on one kind of judgment, practice with feedback, and examples from more than one setting.</p>]]>
      </description>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 8a and 8b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 8a: Why skills stay where they were learned. The "transfer problem": skills learned in one setting so often fail to carry over to another. William James timing his own memorizing, Thorndike and Woodworth's 1901 experiments (training on rectangles barely helped with triangles), the tumor-and-fortress puzzle, in which most people missed an analogy they had just read until a second example helped, Daniel Willingham's argument that critical thinking is tied to knowing a field, and what large reviews found about brain-training games: big gains on the games themselves, little elsewhere, and benefits that shrink as studies get better.</p><p>23:02 Lesson 8b: What training can do, and how far it reaches. Training that does seem to work, and how far it travels: a meta-analysis of critical thinking courses (modest gains on tests, with about one result in four going the other way), a debiasing video game that, in one field study at a Paris business school, cut the share of students choosing a Challenger-style bad bet from about 72 to 59 percent, under an hour of probability training that helped forecasters across a four-year tournament, and creativity training that raises creativity-test scores, with wide variation. What the successes share: focus on one kind of judgment, practice with feedback, and examples from more than one setting.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:09:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
      <enclosure url="https://media.transistor.fm/1be5926a/68577512.mp3" length="33062372" type="audio/mpeg"/>
      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>2748</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 8a and 8b, about 46 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 8a: Why skills stay where they were learned. The "transfer problem": skills learned in one setting so often fail to carry over to another. William James timing his own memorizing, Thorndike and Woodworth's 1901 experiments (training on rectangles barely helped with triangles), the tumor-and-fortress puzzle, in which most people missed an analogy they had just read until a second example helped, Daniel Willingham's argument that critical thinking is tied to knowing a field, and what large reviews found about brain-training games: big gains on the games themselves, little elsewhere, and benefits that shrink as studies get better.</p><p>23:02 Lesson 8b: What training can do, and how far it reaches. Training that does seem to work, and how far it travels: a meta-analysis of critical thinking courses (modest gains on tests, with about one result in four going the other way), a debiasing video game that, in one field study at a Paris business school, cut the share of students choosing a Challenger-style bad bet from about 72 to 59 percent, under an hour of probability training that helped forecasters across a four-year tournament, and creativity training that raises creativity-test scores, with wide variation. What the successes share: focus on one kind of judgment, practice with feedback, and examples from more than one setting.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Module 9: The stage models and the evidence for them</title>
      <itunes:episode>10</itunes:episode>
      <podcast:episode>10</podcast:episode>
      <itunes:title>Module 9: The stage models and the evidence for them</itunes:title>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:block>Yes</itunes:block>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">44b16103-4493-42c9-a622-fae68c97d04c</guid>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 9a and 9b, about 45 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 9a: Where the stages came from. How Henri Poincaré's flash on a bus step, Hermann von Helmholtz's sunny hills and one chapter by the political scientist Graham Wallas became the famous stages of preparation, incubation, illumination and verification; the "intimation" Wallas placed inside illumination, the faint sense of an idea on its way, which mostly got lost; John Dewey's five logical steps of everyday reasoning; and how the stages became templates like the Design Council's Double Diamond, though both Wallas and Dewey said their stages overlap.</p><p>22:39 Lesson 9b: Do we really think in stages? What researchers found when they got closer to thinking as it happens: Flower and Hayes's writers thinking aloud, planning and revising throughout; Mintzberg's 25 organizational decisions, which cycled back in every case; Connie Gersick's eight project teams, which changed course at almost exactly the halfway point to their deadline; and art students who described seventeen stages of their own. Stages turn out to be a good map of the kinds of work thinking involves, and a poor timetable of when that work happens.</p>]]>
      </description>
      <content:encoded>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 9a and 9b, about 45 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 9a: Where the stages came from. How Henri Poincaré's flash on a bus step, Hermann von Helmholtz's sunny hills and one chapter by the political scientist Graham Wallas became the famous stages of preparation, incubation, illumination and verification; the "intimation" Wallas placed inside illumination, the faint sense of an idea on its way, which mostly got lost; John Dewey's five logical steps of everyday reasoning; and how the stages became templates like the Design Council's Double Diamond, though both Wallas and Dewey said their stages overlap.</p><p>22:39 Lesson 9b: Do we really think in stages? What researchers found when they got closer to thinking as it happens: Flower and Hayes's writers thinking aloud, planning and revising throughout; Mintzberg's 25 organizational decisions, which cycled back in every case; Connie Gersick's eight project teams, which changed course at almost exactly the halfway point to their deadline; and art students who described seventeen stages of their own. Stages turn out to be a good map of the kinds of work thinking involves, and a poor timetable of when that work happens.</p>]]>
      </content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 08:10:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <author>Adam Davidson</author>
      <enclosure url="https://media.transistor.fm/dedb7b05/6050f2c3.mp3" length="32383747" type="audio/mpeg"/>
      <itunes:author>Adam Davidson</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>2692</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
        <![CDATA[<p>Lessons 9a and 9b, about 45 minutes.</p><p>0:00 Lesson 9a: Where the stages came from. How Henri Poincaré's flash on a bus step, Hermann von Helmholtz's sunny hills and one chapter by the political scientist Graham Wallas became the famous stages of preparation, incubation, illumination and verification; the "intimation" Wallas placed inside illumination, the faint sense of an idea on its way, which mostly got lost; John Dewey's five logical steps of everyday reasoning; and how the stages became templates like the Design Council's Double Diamond, though both Wallas and Dewey said their stages overlap.</p><p>22:39 Lesson 9b: Do we really think in stages? What researchers found when they got closer to thinking as it happens: Flower and Hayes's writers thinking aloud, planning and revising throughout; Mintzberg's 25 organizational decisions, which cycled back in every case; Connie Gersick's eight project teams, which changed course at almost exactly the halfway point to their deadline; and art students who described seventeen stages of their own. Stages turn out to be a good map of the kinds of work thinking involves, and a poor timetable of when that work happens.</p>]]>
      </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:keywords></itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
  </channel>
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